Defogging Climate Change Communication: How Cognitive Research Can Promote Effective Climate Communication by Dorothee Amelung et al.
OPINION
published: 31 August 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01340
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1340
Edited by:
Marino Bonaiuto,
Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
Reviewed by:
William D. Crano,






This article was submitted to
Environmental Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 20 April 2016
Accepted: 22 August 2016
Published: 31 August 2016
Citation:
Amelung D, Fischer H, Kruse L and
Sauerborn R (2016) Defogging
Climate Change Communication: How






Research Can Promote Effective
Climate Communication
Dorothee Amelung 1, Helen Fischer 1*, Lenelis Kruse 1 and Rainer Sauerborn 2
1Department of Psychology, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany, 2Climate Change and Health Working Group,
Institue of Public Health, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany
Keywords: climate change, IPCC AR5, understanding, health information, communication
It is a truism, but unfortunately not true: policy-relevant climate information should be
communicated such that non-scientists can understand. Through their assessment reports, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) periodically assesses global climate research,
and creates “Summaries for Policymakers” (SPM) which constitute a synopsis of the most
policy-relevant findings. The SPMs’ main principles include being “audience-appropriate” and
“policy-relevant but not policy-prescriptive” (IPCC, 1998). To do justice to these principles, the
communicated climate sciencemust deliver an optimal basis for decision-making by non-scientists.
However, SPMs are written in a highly scientific style. In a recent linguistic analysis, SPMs’
readability proved to be extremely low, scoring even below scientific publications (Barkemeyer
et al., 2015). There is, however, reason to believe that more effective climate communication
is possible. Recent research has shown that despite a long-held skepticism (e.g., Sterman,
2008), accessible presentation formats can increase understanding of the dynamically complex
determinants of climate change (Fischer et al., 2015). Importantly, the communication of highly
scientific topics such as climate change or health is generally either intended to promote predefined
behavior change in the recipient (e.g., anti- smoking-campaigns; messages that aim at the reduction
of red meat consumption), or may induce premature closure around specific strategies by
unintentionally shaping public discourse and opinion (Amelung and Funke, 2015). Because SPMs
should not be policy-prescriptive, however, they should enable informed decision-making without
promoting specific response strategies or unintentionally and prematurely narrowing down public
debates.
This article therefore is concerned with how to improve understanding—the accuracy of
the recipient’s reasoning—to allow for informed decision-making. A central aspect of improved
communication is to reduce the amount of detail covered in the SPMs to a cognitively manageable
degree, and to ensure that key information is conveyed. We selectively review cognitive process
theories and findings derived from the area of health communication meant as starting points for
empirical research toward more effective climate communication.
REASONS FOR LOW READABILITY: THE PROCESS OF WRITING
THE IPCC REPORTS
It is crucial to know the unique IPCC editing process to understand why its readability is generally
low and to propose ways to improve the communication of results to specific audiences. The
following description of the editing process is based on the personal experience of one of the authors
of this article (RS), who was a lead author of the most recent IPCC report’s health chapter (Smith
et al., 2014).
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The IPCC constitutes a global panel of approximately
6000 scientists proposed by governments based on merits and
geographical location. Approximately 12–15 scientists work
on each chapter. A key driver of the IPCC report’s low
readability may be its iterative editing procedure, going back
and forth between the governments, and IPCC teams. In a
first stage, governments define the scope of the report, which
they commission. The scientists work out three iterations of
the Assessment Reports, which are rigorously evaluated—first by
experts and then by the public as the pre-final drafts are made
available on the internet. Everybody is allowed to comment, and
review editors ensure that all comments are addressed. The third
draft is then presented to a plenary of delegations from each
country. This long process of evaluation and modification may
adversely affect the readability of the document, because clear
statements may be avoided in response to critical comments
during the editing process. In such an atmosphere of extreme
cautiousness, vague statements may be preferred if the scientific
consensus is not unequivocal, which it rarely is.
On the other hand, the texts are also extremely detailed
because each statement naturally has to be substantiated as
much as possible (“traceable accounts”). As detail stands in sharp
conflict with space constraints (e.g., a limit of 25 pages for all
aspects related to health), texts may then be condensed into
highly complex graphs, which in turn affects comprehensibility.
It is therefore necessary to find communication means that limit
complexity and ensure that key information is conveyed. One
example area where this has been successfully achieved is health.
WHY USE RESEARCH ON HEALTH
COMMUNICATION AS A GUIDE FOR
RESEARCH ON CLIMATE
COMMUNICATION?
Communication on health, and climate information are similar
on key aspects. First, similar to the topic of health, climate change
is highly complex (Rind, 1999) due to an overwhelmingly large
amount of information that grows and changes at a cognitively
intractable pace. Second, both health, and climate information
draw on probabilistic information that is difficult to grasp even
for highly educated audiences. At the same time, probabilistic
information can demonstrably be presented in ways that increase
understanding (Hoffrage et al., 2000). Third, similar to the health
domain, critical action needs to be taken based on uncertain
information (Should we invest in adaptation? Should we invest
in reforestation? e.g., Canadell and Raupach, 2008; Lobell et al.,
2008). This is why it needs to be ensured that the central,
decision-relevant aspects of the information is conveyed. Lastly,
the climate change, and the health domains share considerable
overlap in that climate change is regarded as a large and
increasing health threat (Sauerborn et al., 2009; Smith et al.,
2014), enhancing problems of undernutrition, injury and disease
due to heat waves, and infectious diseases (Sauerborn and Ebi,
2012; Woodward et al., 2014; Phalkey et al., 2015).
However, decisions in the context of climate change may
be considered more extreme than health decisions with respect
to uncertainty, and decision impact. Decisions in the climate
change context are characterized by large amounts of scientific
uncertainty. This does not allow for unambiguous probability
estimates (Amelung and Funke, 2013), even more so than in
the medical field. With the communication of health/medical
evidence, policy makers and the public have become accustomed
to the concept of “significance.” This concept, however, can
rarely be applied to climate science, further enhancing the
difficulties associated with probabilistic evidence. The effects
of climate change will only show decades or centuries later
(Wigley, 2005), thereby also affecting future generations. The
large time lags inherent in the climate system, and the large
regional variability of its effects (Tebaldi and Friedlingstein,
2013) also pose particularly strong motivational barriers to take
action (Gifford, 2011). Today’s decision-makers will not be
personally affected by the outcomes of their climate action—
or inaction—, and they will not be held accountable for them,
whereas decisions concerning health are typically characterized
by stronger personal affection and accountability.
These extreme characteristics of climate decisions enhance the
necessity of research on effective climate communication since
the perceived necessity to act per se is lower than in health. Several
years ago, it was reasoned that health communication should be
more successful (World Health Organization, 2002), especially at
conveying complex messages (Freimuth and Quinn, 2004), and
should no longer be based on researchers’ intuition but rather
on evidence about how the information is understood (Reyna,
2008). A substantial amount of evidence is now available showing
how effective health communication can improve understanding,
quality of decision-making, health behavior, and even health itself
(for reviews, seeHouts et al., 2006; Coulter and Ellins, 2007; Street
et al., 2009). We believe that it is high time for evidence-based
(instead of constraint-based) climate communication, and that
cognitive psychology can and should deliver such evidence.
HOW CAN COGNITIVE THEORY AND
FINDINGS FROM HEALTH INFORMATION
FOSTER EFFECTIVE CLIMATE
COMMUNICATION?
A large body of research within the cognitive sciences shows
that the way information is presented affects both understanding
and the credibility of the information. Specifically, analytical
processing of all factual details is not sufficient or sometimes
even counterproductive for comprehension of uncertain and
complex information (Kahneman, 2003; Reyna, 2004; Marx et al.,
2007). Highlighting the global patterns of dynamically complex
systems such as the climate may lead to more accurate reasoning
than a more analytical and detailed perspective (Fischer and
Gonzalez, 2015). Comprehension may also be improved when
the presentation format highlights key points, and helps to
reduce cognitive effort (Peters et al., 2007). Moreover, studies
on the effects of experienced cognitive ease demonstrate that as
the difficulty of processing information increases, its estimated
credibility decreases (Oppenheimer, 2006; Kahneman, 2011).
This has the important implication that if readers of the SPMs
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experience reduced processing fluency, they may perceive the
SPMs as less credible and trustworthy. In the following section,
we provide some illustrations for our claim that cognitive theory
and evidence could be used to enhance climate communication
in the SPM’s graphs and texts.
Representation of Graphs
IPCC graphs are full of detail. While this is understandable
given the complexity of the topic, the wish to convey exhaustive
information may exert paradoxical effects: recent meta-analyses
and reviews on the communication of health information (Houts
et al., 2006; Zipkin et al., 2014) find that “simple” graphs that
minimize distracting details are generally better understood, so
that reducing the amount of information contained in a single
graph might ironically lead to better-informed decision-makers.
Moreover, similarly to the results on cognitive ease mentioned
above, poor comprehension of graphs seems to be associated
with the impression that the evidence is of poor quality and
not persuasive (Ancker and Kaufman, 2007). This has important
implications also for climate change communication: if the
SPM’s graphs fail in comprehensibility, their messages might lose
credibility and be rejected altogether.
Interestingly, when it comes to communicating interactions,
data may be better understood when explained via text rather
than graphs (Parrott et al., 2005; Fischer et al., 2015). Fischer
et al. found that if it is explicitly mentioned how different
system elements interact (such as that CO2 emissions and
absorptions jointly shape atmospheric CO2 concentration), the
understanding of the overall system behavior is increased,
compared to the “same” information is depicted in a line graph.
Representation of Text
Due to the word-by-word negotiation cycles described above, the
texts are likely to give statements that are non-controversial and
factual enough that everyone can agree upon them. However,
providing facts and details is not sufficient, and sometimes even
counterproductive if people do not extract the appropriate gist
(Reyna, 2008). The gist of information refers to its bottom-line,
its general and qualitative meaning. Importantly, while people
encode both verbatim and gist information, they prefer to operate
on the crudest possible gist to make a decision, and this tendency
for gist-based decisions increases with expertise. For example,
expert cardiologists compared to medical students achieve better
discrimination between higher and lower risk patients, however,
the better discrimination is achieved using fewer dimensions of
information (Reyna and Lloyd, 2006).
Hence, when policy-makers translate the findings presented
in the SPMs into action, they will, argued from a cognitive
process perspective, base their decisions on gist—and not the
verbatim numbers. Such a cognitive process perspective is a
useful framework for an empirical approach toward greater
readability, and shows that an assessment of the representations
decision-makers actually hold after reading the SPMs may
serve as a crucial basis for deriving evidence-based guidelines
toward greater readability. Moreover, it also does justice to the
constraints of the write-up process by providing an empirical
basis for the question of what information to focus on: the
information that policy-makers actually rely on when making
decisions.
CONCLUSION
As done successfully in the area of health communication,
evidence-based communication should guide the presentation of
climate information. This should hold despite—or rather:
because of the particular constraints posed by detailed
negotiation cycles. Although the SPMs’ readability was shown
to be very low (Barkemeyer et al., 2015), it is yet unclear
how this affects cognitive outcomes such as understanding,
credibility, and use of information. We believe that cognitive
research could deliver the evidence needed to communicate
climate information in a way that fosters understanding and
informed decision-making. Future research should therefore
develop and test communication guidelines based on cognitive
process theories and with appropriate target audiences such as
policy-makers. Understanding of climate information is not
sufficient for grounded climate action; it is however, necessary.
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